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INTOXICATING LIQUORS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota has recently
handed down a decision in the case of Paul Jones & Co. v.
Yokum, 123 N. W. 272, involving the question of interstate com-
merce as applied to the sale of intoxicating liquors. The law of
South Dakota requires all persons who sell, or offer for sale, in-
toxicating liquors in quantities of five gallons or more to pay a
license of $5oo.oo per annum in every township, precinct, town
or city in which said sale, or offer for sale, is made. The plain-
tiffs were wholesale liquor dealers in Louisville, Kentucky, and
the defendant a retail liquor dealer residing and doing business
at Pierre, South Dakota. Plaintiff's traveling salesman solicited
an order from the defendant, who gave his notes in payment
therefore, such order and notes being subject to the approval of
his principals in Louisville, Ky. The order was received at Louis-
ville, the notes there approved, and the goods shipped f. o. b.,
Louisville, addressed to the defendant at Pierre. It thus appears
that the sale was consummated and delivery made in Kentucky.
The above action was brought to enforce the payment of the
above notes; the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the
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plaintiffs, but the supreme court on appeal reversed the lower
court, holding that such notes were unenforceable where the
wholesalers had not taken out a license as required by law.
It was contended on the part of the plaintiffs that this was an
interstate commerce transaction and that the power to regulate
such rested entirely with Congress to the exclusion of the state
authorities, Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 444; Asher v. Texas.
128 U. S. 129, and that this power was not changed by the so-
called Wilson Act (26 U. S. Stat. at Large, 313), as that act
applied to the liquor only after it came within the borders of a
state or territory, making; it then subject to the operation and
effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted in the exercise
of its police power. This view was not upheld by the supreme
court and it bases its opinion upon four cases, i. e., Conrad-Seipp
Brewing Co. v. Green, 122 N. W. 662 (S. D.); Delameter v.
State, 205 U. S. 93; State v. Asher, 54 Conn. 299, and Lang v.
Lynch, et al., 38 Fed. (C. C.) 489.
A careful consideration of these four cases throws some doubt
on the soundness of the decision in the principal case, as the first
two cases are distinguishable from the principal case and not in
point therewith, while the latter two cases have been in effect
overruled.
In the Conrad-Seipp case, orders were taken from several per-
sons for a car load of beer. The car load was then shipped to a
central point within the state and each individual order re-
shipped, under the direction of an agent of the wholesaler, from
that point within the state to other points within the same state.
The court held that the purchase price of such liquors could not
be recovered, no license authorizing the sale having been obtained.
This act of re-distributing made that car a warehouse and brought
the transaction within the provisions of the so-called Wilson Act,
hence, liable to the license laws of the state, and this act of re-
distribution clearly distinguishes this case from the principal case.
lit re Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. & 422.
In the Delameter v. State case a traveling salesman solicited
orders for quantities of liquor less than five gallons, to be for-
warded for acceptance to another state, where delivery was to be
made, and he had not paid the license fee upon the business of
selling, or offering for sale, intoxicating liquors at retail by the
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jug or bottle in lots less than five gallons. It was there held that
the state legislature had the power to require the payment of a
license before engaging in the business of soliciting orders, or
offering for sale liquors, and there being a specific law in that
state upon that subject, Delameter was guilty of a violation there-
of. This point differentiates this case from the principal case, as
there is no law in South Dakota requiring a traveling salesman
to pay a license upon the business of soliciting orders for liquor
in quantities in excess of five gallons.
The case of State v. Asher has been in effect overruled by the
case of Eager v. Burke, 74 Conn. 537. In this latter case, in re-
ferring to section 3o87 of the General Statutes of that state,
which prohibit the sale of liquors without a license "by sample,
by soliciting and procuring orders, or otherwise," the court uses
this language: "The decision (in State v. Asher) does not hold
that the person making the sale in another state sells the goods in
this state by procuring orders, or otherwise, in violation of our
law, and its effect should not be extended beyond the precise
point necessarily involved." See also N. Y. Breweries Corp. v.
Baker, 68 Conn. 341, where the State v. Asher case is com-
mented upon. In so far as State v. Asher is an authority uphold-
ing the principal case, it has thus been overruled.
The Lang v. Lynch, et al., case held that orders taken for the
sale and delivery of liquors in violation of the law of the state
were part of the contract of sale, and as such rendered the entire
transaction void. This case is founded upon the construction of
the New Hampshire law placed thereon by the courts of that
state-as it is a well known rule that the Federal courts will
follow the construction put upon the state statutes by the highest
courts of that state-in the case of Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H.
243. This case of Jones v. Surprise has twice since been passed
upon by the supreme court of that state, once before the passage
of the Wilson Act in the case of Durkee v. Moses, 67 N. H. 115,
and once after the passage of that act in the case of Corbin v.
McConnell, 52 AtI. 447 (N. H.), and was overruled by the su-
preme court in both cases. Hence, the case upon which Lang v.
Lynch, et al., rests having fallen, that case falls with it and can-
not now be considered as an authority in point.
The petition for a rehearing filed on the part of the plaintiffs
in the" main case goes into these four cases in detail, taking each
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one up separately and considering it in relation to the main case.
The decision in the main case gives an extra-territorial effect
to the laws of the State of South Dakota, and bases its reason
for so doing upon the power given the several states and terri-
tories over interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors by the
Wilson Act and the fact that the commodity involved in the main
case was intoxicating liquor. But the Wilson Act, as construed
by the Supreme Court of the United States, gives the several
states and territories power over interstate commerce in intoxi-
cants only after such have arrived within the borders of the state
or territory, and does not give the states authority to interfere
with interstate commerce in liquors by enacting laws having an
extra-territorial effect. Corbin v. McConnell, 52 Atl. 447 (N.
H.). All the authorities, both state and federal, are reviewed in
this case. See also State v. Hanaphy, 117 Ia. 15; State v. Hickox,
64 Kan. 650; In re Loeb, 72 Fed. 657.
There is no question but what a state may impose a license
upon the business of soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors,
and where a statute has been enacted doing this, all the authori-
ties concede that an order taken to be filled in another state, and
the contract there completed, no license having been obtained,
comes within the provisions of the Wilson Act, and is not con-
trary to that clause of the United States Constitution giving
Congress the sole power to regulate commerce among the several
states. But a great many appear to lose the distinction between
the cases where such a statute imposing a license upon the busi-
ness of soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors exists, and the
cases where there is only a statute imposing a license upon the
sellhIg of such liquors. In the first instance, Congress by the
Wilson Act has delegated its power to regulate interstate com-
merce in intoxicants to the several states, while in the second
instance, the order being taken in the one state does not overcome
the fact that the sale is really made and completed in another
state, and when the goods are shipped into the state where the
order is taken, they become a part of interstate commerce. In
the states where there is a statute imposing a license upon the
business of soliciting orders, the seeking and taking of the order
is a separate and distinct transaction from the sale. In the states
where there is no such statute the soliciting of the order and the
actual sale are an entirety and the laws in such a state cannot be
given an extra-territorial effect.
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The later cases, at first inspection, appear to be inconsistent
with the earlier ones, but if this distinction is borne in mind, all
can be reconciled.
The law of South Dakota imposes the duty of obtaining a
license upon all wholesale liquor dealers who "sell, or offer for
sale." If the phrase "offer for sale" can be construed as mean-
ing the business of soliciting orders, the main case is sound 
in
both principle and law; if such cannot be so construed, then the
principal case is not consistent with the rule as laid down by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Delameter v. State,
above cited. Bearing in mind the distinction above noted, the
only question in the principal case is how to construe the phrase
"offer for sale," the decision in the main case impliedly (no
express mention being made in the opinion as to this question)
construing such phrase as meaning a business.
DUTY OF STREET RAILWAY CONDUCTOR TO MAKE 
CHANGE.
The tender of a five-dollar gold coin by a passenger for three
fares on a street railroad was held to be an unreasonable amount
by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Burge v. Georgia Ry. &
Elec. Co., 65 S. E. Rep. 879, and the plaintiff was denied the right
to have a jury pass upon the question as to w'hether or not the
conductor should have accepted the five-dollar gold piece and
made change for it. As to the rule of the defendant railroad
requiring conductors to carry change to the amount of two 
dol-
lars and no more, the court followed the decisions in New 
York
and Pennsylvania and held that whether the rule was reasonable
or not is a matter of law to be determined by the court.
Pennsylvania, New York and California seem to be the only
other states in which this question has arisen as to the reasonable-
ness of tendering a five-dollar piece for a five cent fare.
In Barker v. Centrat Park N. E. R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 237, the
court held that the tender of a five-dollar bill was unreasonable
as a matter of law, even though the conductor admitted in 
the
evidence that he was able to make the change. A superior 
court
in Pennsylvania has followed this New York decision, holding
that the tender of a five-dollar bill was unreasonable as 
a matter
of law. Muldowny v. Traction Co., 8 Penn. Sup. Ct. 335.
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In Barrett v. Market St. Ry. Co., 81 Cal. 296, the supreme
court, affirming the trial court, held that it is not necessary that
a passenger tender the exact amount of fare on a street car, but
he must tender a reasonable amount, and the carrier must furnish
change, and that five dollars is such a reasonable amount. The
court added: "It is a well-known fact that the five-dollar gold
piece is practically the lowest gold coin in use in this section of
the country," and the New York court distinguishes this de-
cision on the ground that there probably existed local reasons for
such a decision in California.
In these cases the five dollars was tendered for one fare, but
the Georgia court sees no difference, apparently, between tender-
ing that amount for one fare or for three fares. The mere
tendering of five dollars to a street car conductor, it holds, is un-
reasonable as a matter of law, and it would seem that this court
would hold that the tender of a five-dollar piece for a dozen fares
would also be unreasonable as a matter of law. However, if
each of the three passengers bad tendered a two-dollar bill, re-
quiring the conductor to change six dollars, the court would have
been compelled to hold it reasonable as a matter of law.
The Georgia court further held that whether it is reasonable
for the railroad company to make a rule that conductors shall
furnish change for two dollars and no more, is not a. question of
fact for the jury. The court says that what would appear reason-
able to one jury would not so appear to another, and that there
would be no fixed rule by which the corporation and the public
should be governed. In reviewing the few cases on this point,
however, it would seem, that the courts themselves are not
absolutely certain as to what is reasonable. In summing up the
cases on this point, a note to Barker v. Central Park N. E. R. R.
Co., in 35 L. R. A. 489, says that the result of the decisions is to
lay down the rule that a reasonable sum may be tendered and
change required, but to leave the question what is reasonable
quite uncertain.
EVIDENCE: PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS IN WRITING THAT HAVE
PASSED BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE PARTIFS.
In O'Toole v. Ohio German Fire Insurance Co., 123 N. W.
795, the Supreme Court of Michigan was called upon to decide a
question which arose for the first time in that state and upon
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which the court says: "The cases are not numerous; the rulings
are not harmonious." This was an action by Myrtle E. O'Toole
to recover on a contract of insurance. That one ground of de-
fense was that she had herself burned the insured property, that
she wrote letters to her husband containing statements tending to
prove this charge, that the letters were accidently lost by the hus-
band, found by a third party, and delivered to the defense. The
court decided that these letters should have been received in
evidence.
That these letters were privileged communications in the hands
of the husband can scarcely be doubted. See 4 Wiginore on
Evidence, Sect. 2332-2341. The question then arises: is the
privilege lost when the letters come into the hands of a third
person? 23 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd. ed.), 95, says:
"It has been repeatedly held that where such a letter has come
into the hands of a third person, it may be produced in evidence
but there are, on the other hand, a number of cases in which this
has been denied." A review of the cases there cited shows a
great confusion of opinion.
The case of State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, is one of the earliest
cases on the subject. In that case, certain letters written by the
defendant to his wife were admitted to disprove his claim as to his
mental condition at the time of committing the alleged offense.
The letters were admitted on the theory that this sort of evidence
is the same as that of one who has overheard a conversation whici
would otherwise have been confidential. The court says: "The fact
that the communications in this case were written, places them on
no higher grounds than if they were merely oral. And as to the
latter, it is well settled that conversations between husband and
wife are not privileged so as to prevent a third person who over-
heard them from testifying." State v. Centre, 35 Vt. 378; Con.
v. Griffin, 1IO Mass. i81.
In State v. Mathers, 64 Vt. ioi, the prisoner wrote a crimina-
tory letter to his wife and gave it to his daughter to hand to her;
before delivery, it was stolen from the messenger by another
daughter and given to the prosecution. The court in admitting
the letter, said: "Conceding this letter would have been a pri-
vileged communication in the hands of the wife, yet this is not a
reason for excluding it, coming into the possession of the prosecu-
tion as it did. When papers are offered in evidence, the court
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can take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally
or illegally, properly or improperly, nor will it form a collateral
issue to try the question." i Greenleaf on Evidence (I6th ed.),
Sec. 2 5 4 a; Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302 and note; Com. v.
Dana, 2 Met. Mass. 329. And this reasoninz has been followed in
Geiger v. State, 6 Neb. 545; State v. Buffington, 20 Kans. 599,
and Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 Fed. Rep. 4. (Cal. Statute.)
The case of State v. Buffington, supra, carries this doctrine to a
very dangerous extent. The defendant wrote a letter to his wife
and sent it by mail; the witness got it from the post office and took
it to the wife; she read it and immediately turned it over to the wit-
ness voluntarily. The court allowed this letter to be read in evi-
dence. If this decision were to be followed, it would practically
destroy the privileged communication rule. All that would be
necessary to destroy "the sacred shield of privilege" would be
to hand over the excluded evidence to some creditable witness
and have him bring it into court. Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga.
729, is directly contra to the Kansas decision. A letter written to
a Mrs. S. by her husband was handed by her to the defendant
and he was not permitted to read it in evidence. The court said:
"Irs. S. would not have been permitted as a witness on the
stand to read to the jury a letter which he (S.) had written to
her. We are therefore decidedly of the opinion that the same
result cannot be indirectly accomplished by her voluntarily de-
livering a letter of this kind to another person.
The New York case of People v. Hayes, 14o N. Y. 484, has
been cited as supporting this kind of evidence. But, the facts in
that case were peculiar and it can scarcely be said to uphold this
doctrine. The defendant's wife wrote a letter to him which con-
tained statements tending to discredit some of the testimony given
by her in his behalf ; he had voluntarily delivered this letter to the
witness; the wife not being a party to the suit, the husband was
the only one injured by the introduction of the letter and he was
held to have waived the privilege by giving it over to a third per-
son. As the court well says: "In this case, every reason upon
which the rule rejecting a privileged communication was original-
ly founded is absent."
In Ward v. State, 7o Ark. 204, the letter sought to be in-
troduced was written partly to a wife and partly to a third per-
son; the two parts of the letter were separable and the court
admitted the part to the third person but excluded that to the
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wife. There is a dissenting opinion in this case, however, by the
learned Chief Justice in which he expresses it as his view that
no part of the letter was admissible, and cites a note in 15 L. R.
A. 268, which criticises very severely the reported case of State
v. Mathers, supra.
The cases which hold that privileged letters and papers re-
tain the privilege without regard to the custody or control seem to
be based on the better reasoning and the Supreme Court of
Florida in the case of Mercer v. State, 4o Fla. 216, discusses the
subject with great zeal and thoroughness. The letter sought to
be introduced was procured from the wife to whom it was writ-
ten; the record does not show how it was obtained. The court in
refusing to admit it says: "There is a considerable array of
authorities to the effect that when confidential communications
between husband and wife get out of the control and possession
of the parties to the confidence and their agents and attorneys
and find their way into the possession and control of third per-
sons, regardless of the manner in which the possession thereof
may be obtained by such third persons, that then such com-
munications lose the protected privilege of the law and become
competent and admissible evidence. See i Greenleaf o Evi-
dence, Sect. 254a; notes to Com. v. Sapp, 29 Am. St. Rep. 415.
We cannot agree to the correctness of this rule thus broadly laid
down by these and other authorities, but think the policy of the
law, that forms the foundation of the general rule, is far more
strongly upheld and observed by those authorities that recognize
and declare certain classes of communications to be privileged
from the inherent character of the communication itself and that
in such cases the privilege attaches to the communication itself
and protects it from exposure in evidence wheresoever or in
whosesoever hands it may be. Judge Shiras, now of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case of Ligget v. Glenn, 51
Fed. Rep. 381, with great force and clearness explains what we
consider to be the correct rule, as follows: "In considering ques-
tions of this kind, regard must be had to the nature of evidence
sought to be elicited. It not infrequently happens that deeds,
contracts, or other written instruments may be delivered by a
client to an attorney under such circumstances that the attorney
cannot be compelled or permitted to produce the same in evidence
against his client at the demand of an adversary. In this
class of cases, the deed or other written instrument is not of
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itself privileged. It is merely the possession of the attorney that
is protected. . . . In such cases, however, it is open to
the other party to prove, by any competent evidence, the
contents of the paper, because the same are not, in and of them-
selves privileged. The decisions in this class of cases do not
touch the principle that is involved in the matter of confidential
communications, whether written or oral, between client and coun-
sel. In the latter instance the privilege attaches to the communi-
cation itself. * * * Its competency is not dependent
upon the mere manner in which knowledge thereof may be
obtained from counsel. The principle forbidding its use is not
adopted as a mere rule of professional conduct on the part of the
attorney. It confers a right upon the client for his protection and
advantage, and which he alone is authorized to waive. * * *'
The same reasoning applies with equal, if not greater, force to
the communications between husband and wife, upon the in-
violacy of which depends that perfect confidence between the
twain so necessary to maintain the sacred institution of marriage
up to that standard demanded by every well ordered and civilized
society." The court then cites Wilkerson v. State, 91 Ga. 729;
Bowman v. Patrick, 32 Fed. Rep. 368; Mahner v. Linck, 70 Mo.
App. 380; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 8o Tex. Ioi, and Dreier v. Con-
tinental Life Insurance Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 670, as having adopted
the same conclusion on the same line of reasoning. To these
cases should be added the later cases of Scot z'. Co11.. 94 Ky. 511
Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, and Lanctot v. State, 98 Wis. 136,
all of which quote Mercer v. State with approval and base their
decisions on that case.
We are of the opinion that the conclusion reached in the latter
cases is based on the better reasoning and that this sort of evi-
dence ought to be rejected.
MANDAMUS.
A contrariety of opinion presents itself in the question whether
mandamus will lie to compel a corporation to transfer stocks on
its books: If corporation stocks are personal property why should
not a purchaser of such stocks from another, compel, by manda-
mus, a transfer on the books of the corporation?
This question lately presented itself before the Supreme Court
of New York in the case of People e.r rel., Julius Rothenberg v.
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Utah Gold & Copper Mines Co., ii N. Y. Supp. 852, where the
party defendant appeals from a peremptory mandamus issued to
compel it to transfer on its books, stocks purchased by the plaintiff
from another party. The plaintiff claims to be the owner of
i,ooo shares of stock of the corporation evidenced by the certi-
ficates held by him indorsed in blank. He produced his certi-
ficates and offered to surrender them, and demanded that such
stock be transferred on the books of the corporation to himself.
Upon the defendant's refusal, plaintiff obtained a peremptory
mandamus compelling the corporation to make such transfer,
whereupon defendant appeals.
It must be borne in mind that mandamus is a high prerogative
writ, an extraordinary remedy, applied when a party has a right
which cannot be enforced in the courts. In fact, mandamus may
be termed, "a criminal process relative to civil rights." 3 Brev.
(S. C.) 264.
The leading case in this country and one cited most frequently
as laying down the rule on this subject is the case of Shipley v.
Mechanic's Bank, io John. (N. Y.) 484, which holds that manda-
mus will not lie in an ordinary case where a bank refuses to
transfer certain shares on its books, when the applicant has an
adequate remedy to recover the value of the stock. This decision
might be controverted if it could be shown that the question of
the transfer of the bank's stock was one of public concern. Peo-
ple v. Crockett, 9 Cal. 112. But where it is clear that the public
has no interest and that the contending parties have disputed
rights and have a clear, adequate remedy by other means, then
mandamus will not lie. People v. Millers, 39 Hun. (N. Y.) 557;
Currey v. Scott, 54 Pa. St. 270. Mandamus is "the right arm of
the law" with purpose not to investigate and inquire into, but to
command and execute. Tozvnes v. Nichols, 73 Me. 515.
Several leading cases on this subject hold that where a com-
pany refuses a reasonable request to make a proper entry on its
books by the transfer of shares, whereby the owner is liable to be
deprived of any legal right or pecuniary advantage, the company
may be compelled to do its duty by issuance of a writ of manda-
mus. This principle is sustained in the case of In re Klaus, 67
Wis. 4O, a railroad case, which holds that the secretary of a cor-
poration may be compelled to transfer shares of stock on its
books to the plaintiff. The same doctrine is laid down
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in the case of The Green Turnpike Co. v. Bulla. 45 Ind. i,
which holds that where the owner of shares of stock in defendant
company had demanded a transfer on the books to his own name,
which was refused, mandamus may be resorted to, to compel the
corporation to make such transfer. The decision of the above
cases seem to have been founded upon the fact that the Turnpike
and Railroad Cos., though private corporations, serve the pub-
lic and are of public interest and in their refusal to transfer shares
they jeopardize the public's rights. But this theory has been ex-
ploded by decisions of more recent judges. The above rule laid
down by the courts of Wisconsin and Indiana is further sub-
stantiated in the case of State ex rel., Townsend v. Mclver, 2
S. C. N. S. 25; but this case also lays down the startling asser-
tion that mandamus is the only remedy in such circumstances, for
an action against the officers of the corporation is too doubtful
and uncertain to insure a complete and full remedy. This
principle cannot be supported, for innumerable cases following
the English view lay down the rule that an action at law for a
conversion of these shares upon the company's refusal to transfer
is a proper and expedient remedy. Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.,
8 Pick. (Mass.) go; N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y.
30; St. Louis Perpetual Ins. Co. v. Goodfellow, 9 Mo. 93.
The English rule is clearly established on this subject, which
holds that a court will not grant a mandamus to compel a bank
to transfer its stock on its books, for there is a certain and con-
plete remedy obtainable by other actions which are more appro-
priate for the case. The King v. Bank of England, 2 Douglas 526.
Mr. Marshall's text on Corporations, p. 851, says that man-
damus will not lie against a corporation for its refusal to transfer
stock to the plaintiff, because he has an adequate remedy at law
for damages, or in equity to compel the corporation to register
the transfer. Mr. Cook on Corporations, Vol. II, p. ioSS, coin-
cides with the above view, stating further, that assumpsit is the
proper remedy, for the stock of a private corporation has no par-
ticular value and may be purchased readily in open market, or
freely compensated for in damages.
In Massachusetts the question is presented a little differently,
though the same conclusion is reached, in the case of Stackpole v.
Seymour, 127 Mass. io4, where a purchaser of shares of a rail-
road corporation sought mandamus. The court held that, as "no
COMMENTS
public interest or corporate right is in question," the mandamus
must be refused. In Illinois it was held that where it can be shown
that the corporation has arbitrarily refused to make such a transfer
for no good and sufficient reason, there might be a small ground
for a resort to mandamus. People v. Goss, 99 111. 355. This
view was also taken in Georgia in the case of Bailey v. Strohecker,
38 Ga. 259, but was later overruled in the case of The Bank of the
State of Georgia v. Harrison, 66 Ga. 696.
Mandamus is an extraordinary action which can only be in-
voked when there is a clear and established right to be adjudi-
cated. Why should a person insist upon a writ of mandamus to
compel a transfer of stock when an action at law on assumpsit or
an action in equity for specific performance accomplishes the de-
sired results? A right of action is not dependent upon the posses-
sion of certain shares, but could be enjoyed by a possession of
other shares which could be purchased on the market by a recov-
ery of damages equivalent to what the shares would be worth.
Should the aggrieved party think that his action at law would
not sufficiently compensate him he may have a sure and complete
remedy by then compelling the corporation to register a transfer
of the stock and by adjusting the various conflicting rights and
claims of the parties. Rice v. Rockefeller, 134 N. Y.
174; lasagi v. Chicago, B. & Q.,Ry., 129 Mass. 46.
The better opinion derived from the authorities seems to be
that mandamus will not lie to compel a corporation to transfer
its stocks, for it is a high prerogative writ, an extraordinary
remedy, only invoked when the rights of the parties are clear,
precise, and well established. An action at law for damages or a
suit in equity for specific performance is the proper remedy.
